Men for All Seasons? Leadership in Wargaming...
- Piotr Stolarski
- Apr 6
- 8 min read
'The leader says "Come on!", while the commander says "Go on!" Commanders are not leaders' - General Sir Rupert Smith (b. 1943)
I recently came across that interesting take on military leadership on YouTube.
Another one relates to character and comes from General Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord, C-in-C of the German Reichswehr before WWII, who looked at officers this way:
'I divide my officers into four groups. There are clever, diligent, stupid, and lazy officers. Usually two characteristics are combined. Some are clever and diligent — their place is the General Staff. The next lot are stupid and lazy — they make up 90% of every army and are suited to routine duties. Anyone who is both clever and lazy is qualified for the highest leadership duties, because he possesses the intellectual clarity and the composure necessary for difficult decisions. One must beware of anyone who is stupid and diligent — he must not be entrusted with any responsibility because he will always cause only mischief.'
These are certainly striking ways of classifying the tendencies of individuals. What interest do they have for wargaming purposes?
Marshal Davout: 'Clever and diligent'? According to Napoleon, 'He will have his place in History because of Auerstadt. He performed well at Eylau, but, although urged on at Wagram... [his slowness] was the cause of the failure to conclude the battle on the first day.... He also made mistakes at the Moskowa [Borodino].' Strict, well organised, intelligent but uncharismatic... The archetypal commander rather than leader?
Commander ratings in wargames rules are shortcuts for simulating the effectiveness of generals in war. One general may be classed as 'A' (excellent) while another is a 'C' (average) or 'D' (incompetent). Generals are attached to units or formations, and influence them on the tabletop, typically through dice rolls or modifiers. On the surface this seems justified: the instinct to 'rate' generals by reputation or results is not unreasonable.
German General Staff: Neither leaders nor commanders?
However, Hammerstein-Equord's remarks should be qualified. He was writing in a particular era - following the establishment of the German General Staff. Before such Staffs were usual, the nature of command and leadership was somewhat different.
King Jan III Sobieski (1629-1696), nicknamed the Lion of Lechistan (Poland) by the Ottomans, combined 'command' and 'leadership' in his person. Like many legendary pre-modern commanders, he knew how to command an army (maintaining an overall perspective) but lead only the decisive charge in battle (for maximum morale and tactical effect) - e.g. Relief of Vienna (1683).
Napoleon's way of war, while empowering corps commanders, was still highly centralized in his person, which limited the initiative of subordinates, and the command and control effectiveness, and size, of armies. Logistics, communication and transport were still in their infancy. The Prussian General Staff, however, centralized planning and thinking through efficient advisory 'experts', who produced plans and doctrines, and worked with commanders. A corollary was to empower leaders to fulfil mission objectives in their own way. As Prussian Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke said:
'A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest soldier must be conscious of the fact that omission and inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient.'
While initiative was hardly a new thing, leadership was undoubtedly becoming more professional, intentional and integrated - as war became ever more complex. This led to 'mission command' by WWII (command as centralized intent, hand-in-glove with leadership as decentralized execution: both operating at various levels of warfare: e.g. company or corps, depending on the mission).
Marshal Joachim Murat: 'stupid and lazy' or 'gallant and courageous'? Both? Neither? A great leader in a charge... not so much of a commander out of one.
Hammerstein-Equord was a nobleman and staff officer. But many Napoleonic generals had 'humble' backgrounds. All acquired experience and rose by perceived merit, not simply innate characteristics. Other variables mattered (attitude, virtues, moral and physical courage, humility, flair, discipline, personal psychology, training, judgement, patronage and connections, etc.), and are often found in unexpected combinations alongside limitations, contrary to Equord's dictum.
The culture of the armed forces at any given point in time is also a factor. Ancient, Eighteenth-century, or WWII generals behaved somewhat differently according to contemporary expectations, quite apart from their personalities being dissimilar. Leadership duties change over time, because warfare does. Yet in victory or defeat (which doesn't necessarily say anything about a leader), standards of excellence remain.
'Stupid and lazy'? General George Pickett: finished last in his class at West Point, was indifferent to details, but a popular, flamboyant, and successful brigade leader. He never proved himself commanding a division. Should he have?
As relevant is that armies must utilise the human resources that they have. Each officer is going to have his strengths and weaknesses, which match the various needs or functions of the army to a greater or lesser extent. Officers are put to use because they are available...
Marshal Berthier
Marshal Berthier ('clever, diligent') was a brilliant chief of staff to Napoleon but not suited to commanding or leading troops into battle. Another example might be Freddie de Guingand, Montgomery's popular and effective chief of staff, a good diplomat, but no fighting general. They fitted their roles, and enabled others to flourish. They were catalysts.
Modern psychology suggests that it's virtually impossible to compel people to 'change' their ways (although influence and growth are possible) unless they want to, or force square pegs into round holes. Luckily, no army (or wargames club) is profitably composed of identical individuals doing things in exactly the same way...
'Diligent and stupid'? NCO archetype 1: The Martinet. Corporal Himmelstoss from 'All Quiet on the Western Front'. Commanded but did not lead...
'Clever and lazy'? NCO archetype 2: The benevolent Father figure. Sergeant Steiner from 'Cross of Iron'. The servant-leader? Leading with charisma...
Although leadership charisma and command clarity are ideally integrated, not every general has to be a Napoleon (what would happen if they were?). Followership is as vital as leadership, at all levels. So, great NCOs and junior officers demonstrate some of the same but also different criteria for excellence. Each leader operates at a different level and in different circumstances, with different objectives, in relationship to those up and down the chain of command. But people skills remain crucial, especially at the business end of war...
Marshal Ney leading the rearguard in the retreat from Moscow (1812). Napoleon feted him as 'bravest of the brave' but remarked that 'He was good for a command of 10,000 men, but beyond that he was out of his depth'. Yet the Emperor gave Ney substantial independent commands in 1813 and 1815 - while marginalising the 'more capable' Marshal Davout. Does energy trump intellect? Davout was respected, Ney was inspirational...
Every army needs a mix of talents and personalities. While some are clever and hardworking, or clever and 'lazy', some are not. All are needed. The most effective army often consists of the best integrated all-arms force led by the best-integrated group of personalities and talents - each balancing others. Also, each level of leadership actually requires service and trust of the people under command (Steiner), not merely dictation of expectations (Himmelstoss).
In wargames, leadership is at least three-fold. We have the historical generals depicted in games as actual miniatures. We also have individual wargamers, each with different strengths and weaknesses, playing different roles. Individual personalities are reflected in decisions and approaches to the wargame, but wargamers cannot be reduced to 'excellent', 'average' or 'poor' - even if some can be less effective - and games like rules differ widely in scope and nature. Thirdly, club members step up to help run the club, engage in the social side, and put on games. Additionally we always advise, support, and trust, players in our games... with a conflab taking the place of advice from a staff officer.
In wargames terms, the challenge is less to get players to perform to one set expectation or standard, and more to encourage them to integrate their ways of thinking, tendencies, and experiences, by reflection and participation. This will foster more imaginative and appropriate decisions: 'mission command' on the tabletop. The hobby, and military leadership, is thus much more than about 'winning' or 'losing'. Our Back of Beyond campaign has been a great opportunity for club members to forge and utilise their own style of leadership and command, from the theatre map to the tabletop. Some quite different approaches have developed as a result...
'Good' generals are qualified and by-the-book, taking few risks; 'lucky' generals know when to break the rules, take risks and win battles... However, taking risks can become predictable, while solidity has a character all of its own. Bottom line: who gets results?
While it might be tempting to assign roles to players based on their character, such typecasting may not be fruitful. 'Cautious' players can be decisive/victorious, while 'aggressive' players can be indecisive/defeated. Wargamers can and do find different ways of achieving the same objectives, whatever their temperament. They also find ways to ignore orders or fail by not understanding the rules or not asking for advice! Victory often goes to the luckiest (6s not 1s), or most effectively cooperative, not just to the best plan, or the boldest move. Real warfare is much the same.
Players' personalities tend to operate in synergy, clash in practice, or generate decisions along a spectrum of tendencies, which may or may not result in appropriate effects on the tabletop. Player decisions, even though constrained by game parameters, cannot be foreseen and any given decision may or may not lead to victory (until it can't). By correlating tendencies in teamwork through communication, better results in games can be achieved. But an overall view or plan is necessary - so who will step up to be C-in-C?
Erwin Rommel helping push a stuck vehicle in North Africa - 'leader' or 'commander'? Inspiring and driven, Rommel is currently considered by historians to have been a brilliant divisional leader but not sufficiently concerned with logistics to have been a winning army commander. Still, could anyone have done a better job in the circumstances?
As warfare has become more all-encompassing, the 'heroic' general can no longer wield as much influence, or at least not in the same way. He must work with the staff, and, in a more holistic and interconnected way, collaborate with the wider command culture. Modern warfare is complex and technologically-driven. Generals still make decisions, but their personal characteristics (clever, diligent, stupid, lazy, etc.) are arguably less decisive, and cushioned because decisions are more often made by junior leaders. Modern generals are also under greater political scrutiny. The same cannot be said of wargamers!
Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord. An outspoken anti-Nazi general, whose ideal was the 'clever and lazy' officer; ironically the best description of Adolf Hitler.
Overall, Hammerstein-Equord's comments (perhaps meant partly in jest) strike me as superficially correct but incomplete. Both generals and wargamers do have personalities and traits of their own. But these are multifaceted and sometimes contradictory, and can't be simplistically reduced to 'characteristic' features. Warfare like wargames consists of many variables at play, which makes it fascinating. Our games would benefit though from players engaging with the history, the rules, and the characters of past military leaders, who are always recognisably human whatever their achievements or follies...
Diverse and effective: La Grande Armée
So are we leaders or commanders - both, neither? What are our strengths and weaknesses? How do we participate in games at the club? Are we better suited to being Colonel of a regiment, or General of an army? Both diverse kinds of leaders and wargamers ideally ought to cooperate, complement, and mutually support one another. But each person has their unique contribution to make. Leading and commanding are two sides of the same coin both in the armed forces and in wargaming, whatever the personalities involved. We take turns at saying 'come on!' as well as 'go on!' Integrating all this can be a challenge, but is also common sense. Even if every club member has limited time and energy, the opportunity to exercise leadership by getting involved in various ways is always on offer, and much appreciated...
See also:
How to become an effective leader with Lt. Colonel Langley Sharp
British Army Leadership. The leader says ‘come on’, while the commander says ‘go on’
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